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Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion
in the Body Politic
Shirley L. Mays*
The City was once a shining star; an example of prosperity,
innovation, and creativity. But it had long since fallen into decay
and its streets were cluttered and unswept. Malefactors left the
innocent to their own devices, and preyed upon one another.
But all is not lost. The elderly gentleman has an idea; he
knows how to save the City. He wants the mayor to allow his
company, a private corporation called Omni Consumer Products
(OCP) to take over operation of the City.
"City hall is the decaying symbol of mismanagement and cor-
ruption," the elderly gentleman asserts. "Sometimes we just have
to start over, from scratch, to make things right and that's exact-
ly what we're going to do." The elderly man patiently explains to
the mayor of the City, "we're going to build a brand new City
where [this one] now stands. An exemplar to the world!"
The elderly gentleman presses a button to reveal the prototype
of his model City--a conglomeration of skyscrapers; their walls
sparkling and reflecting his satisfied face. The elderly gentleman
points to the design. 'Welcome to our City as it should be, and as
it will be in the hands of responsible private enterprise!"
The mayor is nonplussed. "You've got to tear down a lot of
people's houses before you can make that thing," he sputters, 'and
take away their homes!"
"We're going to raise towers of glass and steel," the elderly
gentleman replies. "Every citizen will have a living unit; safe,
secure and clean."
The mayor is still visibly upset. 'Won't be much room for
neighborhoods, huh? Like the kind that we all grew up in?"
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The elderly gentleman remains calm. "These days neighbor-
hoods are just the places where bad things seem to happen. Don't
be nostalgic!"
"What about democracy?" the mayor sputters. "Nobody elected
you!"
"Anyone can buy OCP stock, and own a piece of our city." The
elderly gentleman adds cryptically, "What could be more demo-
cratic than that?"
The mayor remains firm. "There are a lot of people in this
town that can't afford to buy your stock. And they're not going to
let you get away with this!"
The elderly gentleman loses his patience. 'You haven't been
following the polls," he says. "Sit down."1
INTRODUCTION
Our cities are suffering from severe financial and sociological
complications. Last year, more cities than ever finished the year
with a deficit. Tax bases are eroding as both private individuals
and local businesses flee cities -to the comforting arms of the
suburbs and foreign markets. As the urban population is becom-
ing more and more needy, those residents remaining within city
boundaries are loathe to, pass tax increases to pay for the in-
creased costs of providing social services. The sense of commu-
nity that has been the backbone of city life has all but disap-
peared; suburbanites fear the nation's cities and city dwellers
cower behind locked doors and shuttered windows. Neighbors
attempt to reclaim their neighborhoods as the gangster lifestyle
forces its way into the minds and hearts of the young.
As cities become increasingly desperate to tap new revenue
sources and revitalize community pride, many administrations
are beginning to consider the privatization of "public services" as
an alternative to ruin.
The provision of public services by government is a relatively
new phenomena in this country. In the not too distant past, the
care of the sick, the elderly, and the poor was left to individual
devices. Very few social programs sponsored by federal, state or
local government existed before the Roosevelt New Deal in
1932.2 For instance, the debate over federal aid to education
still raged in the 1950's, and in the early 1960's federal housing
1. ROBOCOP II (Orion Pictures 1990).
2. BARRY CARROLL, Introduction to PRIVATE MEANS (Barry Carroll et al. eds.,
Praeger Pub. 1987).
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and hospital programs were in their infancy.' Not until 1966 did
this country see the birth of the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams and Legal Aid emerged as a result of President Lyndon
Johnson's war on poverty.4
The idea that government should provide public services arose
from the fact that many people's needs were not being met.
Many of the destitute and unfortunate were not cared for. They
were forced to rely upon the kindness and generosity of the
community. Consequently, many had inadequate housing and
food and starved to death or died from exposure and disease.
Now, the tables seem to be turning once again toward the
provision of public services by individuals. I maintain that the
private entrepreneur is not the appropriate entity to provide
certain public services. Indeed, governments cannot turn over
the operation of essential governmental services to private com-
panies without abusing the trust of its citizens and putting them
at risk.
This article first discusses the provision of essential govern-
mental services and how local governments came to produce and
provide these public services. Next, it examines the many faces
of privatization; how these concepts of privatization interface
with public service delivery and the concerns regarding constitu-
tional restraints on private entities. Finally, the article views
the privatization debate from a sociological perspective and
discusses the "essence of government" argument. This theory
maintains that wholesale privatization would destroy the sense
of community that has been fostered in the local governmental
setting.
PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES
What do we mean when we talk about privatization? The
most common form of privatization is often referred to as "con-
tracting out."' In its simplest form, contracting out occurs when
governments contract with a private vendor to provide a service.
For example, a city's Parks and Recreation Department may
enter into a contract with a lawn care company to maintain the
grassy knolls of the city parks for the summer. The city has
retained ownership of the parks but has privatized the produc-
tion of the city parks' lawn care service for the term of the con-
3. CARROLL, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Ronald Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ.
L. REv. 449 (1988) (discussing the various kinds of privatization).
1995
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 34:41
tract.
Contracting out was challenged in many jurisdictions as viola-
tive of the civil service provisions of state constitutions.7 It is
now well-settled that cities are free to contract with private
entities for the performance of governmental services.8
The truest form of privatization is known as "load shedding."9
Load shedding results when a city sells a government-owned
facility or equipment to a private entity and the former public
facility becomes a totally private facility. For instance, if a city
decided to get out of the transportation business, it could sell its
bus fleet to a private company while continuing to regulate and
monitor the service. The private company would then own the
buses and assume the responsibility to maintain and operate
them without financial assistance from the city.
The most controversial form of load shedding in the privatiza-
tion debate occurs when the provision of public services is com-
pletely privatized. The essential functions of government, that is
the decision-making, policy-making and regulatory functions, are
no longer in the hands of government officials. In order to pri-
6. Cities are both a provider and a producer of public services. These func-
tions have been described as follows: "One distinct activity of government is to pro-
vide for its people. In other words: policy making, deciding, buying, requiring, regu-
lating, franchising, financing, subsidizing." Ted Kolderie, The Two Different Concepts
of Privatization, CURRENTS AND SOUNDINGS, July/Aug., 1986, at 285. Kolderie contin-
ues: "A second and distinctly separate activity of government may be to produce the
services it decides should be provided. In other words: operating, delivering, running,
doing, selling, administering." Id. at 286.
7. See Corwin v. Farrell, 100 N.E.2d 135 (N.Y. 1951) (illustrative of cases
challenging the ability of a governmental unit to contract with a private company
for the production of public services). In Corwin, the New York Housing Authority
dismissed several tenured civil service employees after it contracted with a private
firm to provide the same services the civil service employees had been performing.
Corwin, 100 N.E.2d at 137. In addressing the legality of the contract that the Hous-
ing Authority entered into with the private corporation, the court held that "neither
constitutional mandate nor statutory enactment requires that all service furnished or
all labor performed for a governmental agency must be supplied by persons directly
employed." Id. at 138. See also Conlin v.. Aiello, 64 A.2d 921 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978);
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 456 F. Supp. 85
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
8. Contracting out is not devoid of detractors. Negative aspects of contracting
out include: a detrimental impact on career public employees; erosion of bitterly
fought merit systems; potential decline in service quality; interruption of services due
to work stoppages; "creaming" practices; loss of tax revenues owing to private sector
delivery incentives; potential for bankruptcies; and fraud and corruption. See CARL
VALENTE & LYDIA MANCHESTER, RETHINKING LOCAL SERVICES: EXAMINING ALTERNA-
TIVE DELIVERY APPROACHES 1 (1984); Ira Sharkansky, Policy Making and Service De-
livery on the Margins of Government: The Case of Contractors, PUBLIC ADMIN. REV.
116-123 (1980); JOHN HANRAHAN, GOVERNMENT FOR SALE: CONTRACTING OUT THE
NEW PATRONAGE (1977).
9. See Cass, supra note 5.
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vatize the provision of public services, the government need only
decide not to provide a particular service. In theory, private pro-
viders would then step in to deliver the service, assuming suffi-
cient demand exists for it. Returning to the transportation ex-
ample, the city can simply decide to no longer provide bus trans-
portation to its residents. The residents and potential entrepre-
neurs would then be left to their own devices regarding the
ability to travel in the city. This article discusses wholesale
privatization. It is by far the most far-reaching form of privat-
ization.
THE CONSTITuTIoNAL ARGUMENTS
City governments may contract out services with little or no
negative effect upon their residents. City workers may lose their
jobs, but from a public policy standpoint, privatization of produc-
tion is not particularly problematic. However, once the local
government decides to privatize the provision of public services,
negative consequences will flow to the citizenry. Placing the
decision-making, policy-making, and other discretionary func-
tions of local government in private hands will seriously affect
city residents who are consumers of the privatized facility.
The constitutional restrictions governing the relationship
between private service providers and their clients are not the
same as those governing the relationship between public service
providers and their clients. For that reason, the privatization
debate cannot be limited to concerns of cost and efficiency or to
concerns regarding the proper size and scope of government.
Private institutions generally are not subject to constitutional
restraints. Therefore, the debate over the merits of proposals for
privatizing provisions of public services must be informed by a
real understanding of the different legal positions of the public
and private sectors.
Rights secured by the United States Constitution are protect-
ed from infringement by the government. The Fourteenth
Amendment proscribes state actions that will "deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."" It
also requires that all similarly situated individuals be treated
equally.11 When governmental actions directly impact citizens,
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Id. Of course, these restrictions only apply when the government is the
actor. As the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883: "[Ilt is
State action of a particular character that is prohibited .... Individual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject matter of the Amendment." The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The state action doctrine which emerged from these
1995
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it is without question that the government is bound by constitu-
tional constraints."2 On the other hand, when private actors,
rather than governmental agencies, perform the same functions
as the government, they are not necessarily subject to the same
constitutional restraints. 3 Therefore, transferring governmen-
tal services to private corporations will diminish the constitu-
tional protections afforded individuals.
In state action cases, courts must determine when an action
by a private institution "may be fairly treated as that of the
state itself."4 In making that determination, courts evaluate a
variety of factors. Those factors include the similarities between
the functions of the private and public actor and the nature of
their interrelationship." Although it initially interpreted these
constitutional safeguards broadly in Marsh v. Alabama,"6 dur-
ing the last fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has
continued to retreat from its original position. Marsh provides
the framework for evaluating interactions between public and
private decision makers and the applicability of constitutional
safeguards.
Private Property Assuming Municipal Characteristics
Marsh is the seminal case dealing with the constitutional
right of freedom of expression and its relationship to a privately-
owned entity. Chickasaw, Alabama, a "company town", was
owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. 7 Ms. Marsh at-
cases permits constitutional protections to be invoked only against "state laws .. .
[or] acts done under State authority." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
12. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (citing The
Civil Rights Cases).
13. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51.
14. Id. at 351.
15. Id.
16. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
17. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502. In his dissent, Justice Reed described a "company
town" as follows:
[An area occupied by numerous houses, connected by passways, fenced or not,
as the owners may choose. These communities may be essential to furnish
proper and convenient living conditions for employees on isolated operations in
lumbering, mining, production of high explosives and large-scale farming. The
restrictions imposed by the owners upon the occupants are sometimes galling
to the employees and may appear unreasonable to outsiders. Unless they fall
under the prohibition of some legal rule, however, they are a matter for ad-
justment between owner and licensee, or by appropriate legislation.
Id. at 513 (Reed, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion describes the company town somewhat more expan-
sively:
Except for that [the fact that Chickasaw is owned by a corporation] it has all
Vol. 34:41
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tempted to distribute religious literature on the company-owned
sidewalk in the Chickasaw business district even though signs
posted in the Chickasaw stores warned: "This is Private Proper-
ty, and Without Written Permission, No Street, or House Ven-
dor, Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted."18 Ms.
Marsh was told to stop distributing the literature and was asked
to leave the sidewalk.19 She refused and was arrested." The
Alabama Court of Appeals upheld her criminal conviction based
upon the fact that the sidewalk on which she distributed her
religious literature was private property, owned by the Gulf
Shipbuilding Company.2
In a 5-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed
Ms. Marsh's conviction.22 The Court acknowledged that a city
could not have proscribed the distribution of the literature in
question." However, it rejected the contention that private
the characteristics of any other American town. The property consists of resi-
dential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a
"business block" on which business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile
County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman. Mer-
chants and service establishments have rented the stores and business places
on the business block and the United States uses one of the places as a post
office from which six carriers deliver mail to the people of Chickasaw and the
adjacent area. The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which can not be
distinguished from the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation's property by anyone not
familiar with the property lines, are thickly settled, and according to all indi-
cations the residents use the business block as their regular shopping center.
To do so, they now, as they have for many years, make use of a company-
owned paved street and sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in order to
enter and leave the stores and the post office. Intersecting company-owned
roads at each end of the business block lead into a four-lane public highway
which runs parallel to the business block at a distance of thirty feet. There is
nothing to stop highway traffic from coming onto the business block and upon
arrival a traveler may make free use of the facilities available there. In short
the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the
public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other
town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs
to a private corporation.
Id. at 502-03.
18. Id. at 503.
19. Id.
20. Id. Ms. Marsh was charged with a violation of Title 14, Sec. 426 of the
1940 Alabama Code wherein it was a crime "to enter or remain on the premises of
another after having been warned not to do so." Id. at 503-04.
21. Id. at 504.
22. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 510.
23. Id. at 506.
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ownership of the sidewalk settled the constitutional question.2'
As the Court explained:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general,
the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and consti-
tutional rights of those who use it."
Relying on the similarities between Chickasaw and a "public"
city, the Court emphasized that the "public in either case has an
identical interest in the functioning of the community in such a
manner that the channels of communication remain free."26
Mere private ownership of property should not be determinative
of the exercise of constitutional freedoms, particularly when
Chickasaw operated like any other city.27 The Court concluded
that the simple fact that the property was not public property
would not justify Gulf Shipbuilding Company's restrictions on the
rights of Chickasaw residents. 8 Moreover, the state should play
no part in enforcing those restrictions.9
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.,"o the Court extended the Marsh analysis to the "functional
equivalent" of the company town, a privately-owned shopping
center."1 In many areas, shopping centers have taken on the
attributes of company towns. They have replaced downtown busi-
ness districts as places where residents gather to receive and
exchange information. Educational and recreational programs are
often performed in the mall. Citizens can attend holiday pro-
grams, meet movie and television stars, participate in tractor
pulls, and greet their neighbors.
In Amalgamated Food, Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. ("Logan")
owned a shopping center known as Logan Valley Mall." One of
the mall's tenants, Weis Markets, posted a sign that prevented
anyone but its employees from trespassing or soliciting on the
covered porch in front of the market, or in the parking lot sur-
rounding the market.3 Members of the Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees Union, none of whom were Weis employees, picketed
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 507.
27. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505-06.
28. Id. at 509.
29. Id.
30. 391 U.S. 308 (1968), questioned, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
31. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 318.
32. Id. at 310.
33. Id. at 310, 311.
Vol. 34:41
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Weis to protest its non-union status." The Court established
that "the picketing was peaceful at all times and unaccompanied
by either threats or violence."35
Weis and Logan asked the court of common pleas to enjoin the
picketing on the porch and parking lot immediately surrounding
Weis Markets. 6 These areas were within the section of the mall
that was privately-owned by Logan. 7 Weis and Logan wanted to
require the union members to picket only in the public areas
outside the shopping center. 8 The court granted their re-
quest. 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the issuance
of the injunction under the rationale that the protesters were
trespassing on Logan's private property.'
In reversing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice Mar-
shall acknowledged that if the area in question was a public
business district, rather than a privately-owned mall, the union
unquestionably would be permitted to picket."' As Justice Mar-
shall pointed out:
[S]treets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so histori-
cally associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access
to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally
be denied broadly and absolutely.2
Justice Marshall referred to the holding in Marsh, wherein the
Court determined that "under some circumstances property that
is privately owned may, at least for First Amendment purposes,
be treated as though it were publicly held."'
The majority held that the mall in Logan Valley and the busi-
ness district in Marsh were indistinguishable." It reiterated and
expanded its rationale in Marsh regarding the constitutional
treatment of the equivalent of the company town.' According to
the Court, the mall with its surrounding sidewalks and streets
operated in the same manner as the downtown of any city."
They served the same function of providing easy and open in-
34. Id. at 311.
35. Id. at 312.




40. Id. at 313.
41. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 319-20.
42. Id. at 315.
43. Id. at 316 (citing Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507).
44. Id. at 319.
45. Id.
46. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 319.
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gress and egress to the business center for members of the gener-
al public.47 Therefore, the Court determined that the only differ-
ence in public use by the two entities would be "that those mem-
bers of the general public who sought to use the mall premises in
a manner contrary to the wishes of the respondents could be pre-
vented from so doing.""
Even though Logan Valley extended the Marsh constitutional
protections to the functional equivalent of a public business dis-
trict, the picketing in Logan Valley was directed at the employ-
ment standards of one of the mall's tenants, Weis Market. 9 The
Logan Valley Court did not consider whether a privately-owned
shopping center could prohibit the distribution of leaflets when
those leaflets were totally unrelated to the operations of the
shopping center.5" Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner"' addressed this issue
and seriously eroded the Logan Valley holding. 2
Delivering the majority opinion for the Court in a 5-4 decision,
Justice Powell focussed on the purpose of the mall, the Lloyd
Center (the "Center"), owned by Lloyd Corp., Ltd. ("Lloyd"). 3
The Center was a large, comprehensive facility.' Its sixty retail
and commercial establishments covered fifty acres, including
parking facilities for over 1,000 cars." The Center was an ex-
pansive complex containing "buildings, parking facilities, sub-
malls, sidewalks, stairways, elevators, escalators, bridges, and
gardens, and contain[ed] a skating rink, statues, murals,
benches, directories, information booths, and other facilities de-
signed to attract visitors and make them comfortable.""6
On November 14, 1968, Mr. Donald Tanner, Ms. Betsy Wheel-
er, and Ms. Susan Roberts (the "Activists") were among five peo-
ple who began distributing invitations to a meeting to protest the
draft and the Vietnam War. 7 The Activists distributed the invi-
tations inside the Center and were at all times orderly and qui-
et." The private security guards who were hired by Lloyd to
maintain order in the Center told the Activists that they would
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 312.
50. Id. at 320 n.9.
51. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
52. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 552.
53. Id. at 552, 564-65.
54. Id. at 553.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 571-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308
F. Supp. 128, 129 (D. Or. 1970)).
57. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 556.
58. Id.
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be arrested if they continued to pass out the invitations."9 The
Activists left the Center and began distributing their literature
on the public streets outside the Center and subsequently
brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief."0
The district court, unable to distinguish this fact situation
from the Supreme Court holding in Logan Valley held, as the
Supreme Court had in Logan Valley, that the Center was the
functional equivalent of a publicly-owned business district and
thus applied the constitutional protections of free speech." The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, limited its decision in Logan Val-ley.62
Justice Powell emphasized the differences between the Center
and the prototype of the company-owned town, particularly as
they each applied to a publicly-owned town.' The company
town, according to Justice Powell, possessed all of the attributes
of a city, including residential buildings, streets, churches, postal
facilities and sewers." However, the analogy between a private-
ly-owned facility and a publicly-owned facility need only be car-
ried so far, and, in fact, was not the gravamen of the Court's
decision in Logan Valley.6" Rather, the Logan Valley decision
applied strictly to protests directed at a store confined within a
mall.6 If such protesting was not made available, protesters
would have "no other reasonable opportunities" to inform the
public of their complaints."7
In Lloyd, the invitations that w~re distributed in the Center
bore no relationship to the purpose and use of the Center it-
self."' Moreover, those who wished to promote ideas totally un-
related to the purposes of the Center had alternative means to do
so." The invitations to attend a rally against the Vietnam War
were directed toward the general public, not to the patrons of the
Center, and could have been distributed "on any public street, on




62. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 563.
63. Id. at 556-70.
64. Id. at 557, 562.
65. Id. at 563.
66. Id. at 564.
67. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 563.
68. Id. at 564.
69. Id. The Court stated that the availability of other means distinguished
Lloyd from Logan Valley. Id. at 566. In Logan Valley, the picketers "would have
been deprived of all reasonable opportunity to convey their message to patrons of
the Weis store had they been denied access to the shopping center." Id.
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in the City of Portland."70
The Center was a business establishment and it invited the
public to come within its walls in order to do business with its
tenants.71 The Center did not solicit the public to come and do
whatever it desired.72 "There is no open-ended invitation to the
public to use the Center for any and all purposes, however in-
compatible with the interests of both the stores and the shoppers
whom they serve. "7" Therefore, Justice Powell concluded that
the Activists' constitutional rights could be restricted.74
The final eradication of the Marsh/Logan Valley doctrine oc-
curred with the decision in the case of Hudgens v. NLRB."5
Hudgens also concerned picketing in an enclosed mall surrounded
by a large parking lot.76 Sixty stores were located within the
mall and most of them, including the Butler Shoe Co. could only
be entered from inside the mall.77 During a strike against Butler
Shoe Co., the strikers, who were employees of the shoe store,
picketed inside the mall while carrying signs that stated "Butler
Shoe Warehouse on Strike, AFL-CIO, Local 315.""8 They were
told they could not picket in the mall or the parking lot.79 The
lower courts found this to be an unfair labor practice, based in
part on the analysis in Logan Valley and Marsh."°
After acknowledging once again that "the constitutional guar-
antee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by
government, federal or state,""' the Court quoted extensively
from the portion of the dissent in Logan Valley which maintained
that Marsh was only intended to apply to situations where pri-
vate property had:
[Tiaken on all the attributes of a town, i.e., "residential buildings,
streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block'
on which business places are situated."2
The Court, in expressly overruling Logan Valley, determined
that neither the shopping center in Logan Valley nor the one in
70. Id. at 564.
71. Id.
72. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 565.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 570.
75. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
76. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 508.
77. Id. at 509.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 509-12.
81. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513.
82. Id. at 516 (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502) (Black, J., dissenting).
Vol. 34:41
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Lloyd were analogous to the company town in Marsh."3 The
Court reasoned that the pickets of the Butler Shoe Co. did not
have the power to exercise their First Amendment rights because
the protesters in Logan Valley and Lloyd did not have such pow-
er. 8  If the Court's analysis in Hudgens actually was applied
as written, only complete private ownership of a town will trigger
the Marsh protections. Every aspect of providing governmental
services would need to be in private hands. It is not enough that
many downtown business districts of municipalities are dead or
dying and have been displaced by suburban shopping malls. If
those shopping malls are owned by private individuals, i.e. the
provision of the "community gathering" function of community
has been privatized, constitutional freedoms can and will be
abridged.
In his dissent in Lloyd over twenty years ago, Justice Marshall
wrote these prescient words:
It would not be surprising in the future to see cities rely more and more
on private businesses to perform functions once performed by govern-
mental agencies. The advantage of reduced expenses and an increased
tax base cannot be overstated. As governments rely on private enterprise,
public property decreases in favor of privately owned property. It be-
comes harder and harder for citizens to find means to communicate with
other citizens. Only the wealthy may find effective communication possi-
ble unless we adhere to Marsh v. Alabama and continue to hold that
"[tihe more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."85
Privatization of Governmental Services
When the provision of a traditional governmental service is
privatized, Marsh's constitutional analysis does not apply. The
Court shifts its attention to the action, rather than the actor, to
determine if the service is one that can be characterized as essen-
tially governmental. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.8" illus-
trates this point.
In Jackson, Catherine Jackson's electric service to her home in
York, Pennsylvania was terminated because she had not paid on
her account for several months.87 Ms. Jackson was not notified
83. Id. at 519 (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567-70).
84. Id. at 520-21.
85. Lloyd, 407 U.S. 551, 586 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Marsh, 326
U.S. at 506).
86. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
87. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 347.
1995
Duquesne Law Review
that her electric service would be discontinued; nor was she given
an opportunity to respond to or challenge the decision to cut off
her electricity."
Metropolitan Edison Co., a privately-owned and operated utili-
ty company that was extensively regulated by the State of Penn-
sylvania, provided service to Ms. Jackson's home.89 Electric ser-
vice was once provided by the state government.90 Metropolitan
Edison had petitioned and received permission from the state to
provide electric service to the residents of York.91 Thus, the City
of York had privatized the provision of electrical service to its
residents.92
Had York provided electric service, rather than privatizing the
service, it is beyond dispute that Ms. Jackson would have had
the right to receive prior notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to the termination of her electric service. It is also indisput-
able that purely private actions, engaged in by purely private
actors, are immune from the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.93
The Court ruled that a sufficient interrelationship between
Metropolitan Edison Co., a private entity, and York, as a repre-
sentative of the state, must exist in order to consider Metropoli-
tan Edison's actions the same as the state's.94  Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that neither extensive
state regulation nor the mere existence of a monopoly were dis-
positive in determining whether state action was present.98 In-
quiry must determine whether a "sufficiently close nexus" exists
between the private company and the state to find state action
present in the private company's actions. 8
In Jackson, the Court held that extensive regulation of the
utility by the state was not sufficient to establish the existence of
state action.97 A heavily-regulated, privately-owned utility was
88. Id.
89. Id. at 346.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 346.
93. Id
94. Id.
95. Id. at 350-51.
96. Id. at 351. The Court stated:
[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself . . .The true na-
ture of the State's involvement may not be immediately obvious, and detailed
inquiry may be required in order to determine whether the test is met.
Id. (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972)).
97. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51.
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permitted to deny service under conditions that would not be
constitutionally permissible for a publicly-owned institution.
.Therefore, state regulatory approval of the actions of privately-
owned providers of services was clearly insufficient to trigger con-
stitutional protections. The implications of this decision are clear
and far-reaching. If the provision of a service that was tradition-
ally provided by the government, such as electric, water or gas
service, is privatized, constitutional safeguards need not apply.
Cities can shift the responsibility of providing services to private
actors, who in turn, can save themselves time and money because
private entities are not required to provide due process
protections to customers prior to terminating their services. As
many of these providers are monopolies, citizens as customers
are helpless to prevent their service from being terminated.
Of the three justices who dissented in Jackson, Justice Mar-
shall challenged the majority's assertion that state action was
not present in this case." He reasoned that since the state had
granted a monopoly to Metropolitan Edison, the company "as-
sume[d] many of the obligations of the State."99
Justice Marshall recognized the dangers of allowing private
entities that perform public services to escape constitutional
constraints. He declared:
Private parties performing functions affecting the public interest can
often make a persuasive claim to be free of the constitutional require-
ments applicable to governmental institutions because of the value of
preserving a private sector in which the opportunity for individual choice
is maximized.... [Ilt is hard to imagine any such interests that are fur-
thered by protecting privately owned public utility companies from meet-
ing the constitutional standards that would apply if the companies were
state owned. The values of pluralism and diversity are simply not rele-
vant when the private company is the only electric company in town."i
Unfortunately, Justice Marshall's reasoning did not prevail.
Private actors providing traditionally public services are not
bound by constitutional protections. As a result, the customers of
these private entities, the residents of the municipalities, suffer
the consequences.
98. Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 366.
100. Id. at 373.
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Homeowner Associations
Further support for the contention that private entities per-
forming public services escape constitutional constraints is pro-
vided by examining the treatment of homeowner associations,
which have been called "residential private governments."'. In
homeowner associations, an elected group governs the residents
of the association. The growth of both condominiums and housing
developments has spawned the proliferation of homeowner asso-
ciations. Homeowner associations are the epitome of the privat-
ization of the provision of governmental services. In homeowner
associations, the government itself has been privatized.
Membership in a homeowner association usually coincides with
the purchase of a home. Upon purchasing a home, the owner
automatically becomes a member of the homeowner association.
Homeowner associations and public governments have many
common attributes. Both entities profess to serve the needs of
their residents by managing common areas and establishing the
parameters of acceptable conduct of their inhabitants. 10 2 For
101. Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey,
43 U. Cin. L. REv. 253 (1976).
102. Reichman, supra note 101, at 254-55. Reichman describes the similarities:
When an individual takes up residence in a city, he automatically establishes
a set of complex legal relations with the local municipal government: he is
subjected to a comprehensive set of rules, granted a variety of rights, and is
entitled to participate in the local political process. In the same way, by the
simple act of acquiring title, a home buyer entering a community regulated by
a residential private government automatically becomes the "subject" of the
organization, owes various legal obligations, and is entitled to specific benefits.
Id.
Reichman continues:
The similarity between the residential private government and its public coun-
terpart also extends to structural matters. The private government is orga-
nized on the basis of certain notions of democratic participation. The
"government" is run by elected officials, each homeowner has the right to vote,
and the majority has the power to change the community's norms. A division
between "administrative" and 'legislative" branches is often maintained. While
certain matters are determined by the discretionary judgment of the
organization's directors and agencies, the basic rules can be abolished or
amended only by the homeowners' general assembly ....
Id.
Reichman concludes that:
Finally, there is resemblance between the regulatory provisions maintained by
both the public and private systems. . . . Comprehensive services like those
usually supplied by municipalities may be furnished by the private organiza-
tion; parks, recreational and cultural facilities may be provided along with the
more traditional services such as street maintenance, snow removal, and gar-
bage collection.
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example, a homeowner association may restrict an owner's ability
to sell or lease his or her. property' and prohibit consumption
of alcohol in common areas.1
Public governments may tax their residents. Homeowner asso-
ciations raise revenue through the imposition of monthly "assess-
ments" and/or dues. Municipal governments are elected by voters
within a specified geographical area. Similarly, the governing
body of the homeowner association is elected by the property
owners within the association. Thus, many of the functions nor-
mally performed by a municipal government have been taken
over by the homeowner association:
By their very nature, associations become mini-governments. They pro-
vide services that in many areas of the country have been provided by
municipalities, including maintenance of common areas, roads, utility
systems (water and sewer), lighting, refuse removal, and communications
systems. Implementation and enforcement by Cas [community or home-
owners associations] of these easements of access, architectural cove-
nants, and use restrictions contained in land documents are analogous to
police and public safety services provided by governmental bodies."n
However, there is one acute difference between homeowner
associations and municipal governments. Public governments are
constrained by constitutional prohibitions regarding individual
rights and freedoms. The homeowner association has no such
restraints because it is not a state actor. Questions have been
raised concerning the constitutionality of the homeowner associa-
tions. For example, most homeowner associations restrict voting
to homeowners. As a consequence, residents who rent property
are disenfranchised in violation of the Equal Protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.0 5 Renters are prevented from voic-
103. See Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n., 81 Cal. App. 3d 688 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978) (Bylaws of condominium association which restricted occupancy in
project to persons 18 years of age or older was reasonable restriction upon owner's
right to sell or lease his condominium unit to families with children.); Worthinglen
Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275 (Oh. Ct. App. 1989)
(An amendment to a condominium declaration prohibiting leasing is not per se unen-
forceable against owners who acquired condominium units before adoption of
amendment.).
104. See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So.2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (Homeowners association could enforce rule prohibiting alcoholic beverages in
clubhouse.).
105. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE/COMMUNITY ASS'N INSTITUTE, MANAGING A SUC-
CESSFUL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION 2 (1974).
106. HUGH MIELDS, JR., URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, FEDERALLY ASSISTED NEW
COMMUNITIES: NEW DIMENSION IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT 2 (1974). Mr. Mields states:
If they are based, as most of them are, on the home owner association con-
cept, serious legal issues arise in terms of equal enfranchisement of all citi-
zens, since most HOAS [homeowner associations] exclude lessees from member-
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ing their opinions about issues that concern them and they have
no effective means of accessing the decision-making process."7
If the holdings of Marsh through Hudgeons were carried to
their logical conclusions, a homeowner association would be the
equivalent of a "company town" and thus be subject to constitu-
tional safeguards. After all, this is an instance when all the at-
tributes of a public government are being performed by private
actors. Rather than treat homeowner associations as they would
municipal governments, courts have employed a test of reason-
ableness when assessing the fairness of association rules and
regulations. The courts have applied a standard of deferential
treatment in reviewing association bylaws. Therefore, the re-
strictions in the bylaws are presumptively valid and must be
uniformly enforced.' 8 The "deference" given to the enactment of
the private laws of homeowner associations gives wide latitude to
homeowner associations to impose constraints upon their resi-
dents/members. The associations have enforced rules that prohib-
ited the distribution of newspapers," ° prevented homeowners
from entering and leaving their condominium through the back
door," ' and interfered with the marital relationship of a newly-
wed couple."'
Other restrictions have been described as follows:
Even vegetable gardens are frowned upon-though some people do grow
tiny ones out of their neighbors' view. Fences, hedges, or walls require
ship. Thus these "private governments" may violate the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In essence, they establish the new community
as a municipal corporation without ensuring that those citizens who will be
governed have a voice in the decision-making process.
Id.
107. MIELDS, supra note 106, at 2.
108. See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So.2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (Restrictions found in a declaration of condominium are presumed valid and
this presumption arises from the fact that the purchasers of the unit do so knowing
of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed. Such restrictions are very much in
the nature of covenants running with the land and they are not invalid absent a
showing that they are arbitrary in application, in violation of public policy, or that
they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.).
109. See Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills, 182
Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
110. United Press International, Couple Sues to Lift Ban on Condo Door, L.A.
TIMES, October 8, 1989, part 8, at 21. The homeowner association claimed that by
walking from their back door to the parking lot, the owners of the unit were mak-
ing an unattractive path in the grass. Id.
111. United Press International, Court Finds Wife Too Young for Retirement
Condo, SAN DIEGO DAILY TRANSCRIPT, December 11, 1987 (The homeowner associa-
tion took the couple to court because the wife was three years younger than the
minimum age for residency. The judge who heard the case ordered the sixty-year old
husband to either sell his home, rent it out, or live there without his wife.).
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approval, and may not be more than three feet tall. Signs, other than for-
sale signs, are prohibited. Trees must be kept trimmed and may not grow
above the level of the roof, which must be covered with red tiles. One vil-
lage, designed more for seniors, prohibits grandchildren from using the
recreation center, and home visitation by grandchildren is strictly limit-
ed. The owners of patio homes ... must gain their neighbors' approval
before altering the patio, planting a rosebush, or raising a canopy."'
When left in private hands, the decision-making and policy-
setting functions of government are driven by considerations of
property values. The decision as to what is best for the communi-
ty exalts money over individual freedoms and, once again, the
citizens of these communities are the losers.
THE ESSENCE OF GOVERNMENT ARGUMENTS
To posit that extensive differences exist between a public and
private entity perhaps states the obvious. However, in the privat-
ization debate, it is necessary to begin from this proposition in
order to fully comprehend the effect privatization will have upon
the citizens of the public corporation community, the municipali-
ty.
Although little distinction was made in colonial times between
a public and a private corporation, over time the contrast be-
tween the two entities became profound."' Courts recognized
this differentiation at law and treated the two entities according-
ly. I14 Although both public and private corporations had constit-
uents to whom they answered,' 5 each was designed to achieve
significantly different objectives.
A private corporation must have the making of money as its
primary goal."6 If it fails to thrive financially, the private cor-
poration faces ruin. To acquire an interest in the corporation and
a right to vote on corporate matters, one has to purchase corpo-
rate stock." 7 The corporation is designed to regulate private in-
112. RICHARD LOUV, AMERICA II 92 (1983).
113. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059,
1101-02 (1980). Cities and private corporations were treated similarly and even had
similar characteristics. For example, the purpose of both public and private corpora-
tions was to further the public good. Id. at 1102-03. Numerous private corporations
possessed the power of eminent domain, the authority to claim privately-owned prop-
erty for a public purpose. Id. Many cities were financed by income from commerce
and trade, the same sources of revenue relied upon by private corporations. Id.
114. See Frug, supra note 113, at 1101-03.
115. The private corporation must answer to its shareholders and the public
corporation must answer to its electorate.
116. See generally the REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1995).
117. Id.
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terests and exists mainly for private gain."'
Conversely, the duties of a public corporation go beyond the
desire for monetary gain. Cities have responsibilities to their
constituents that are essentially political."' A city is not a busi-
ness designed to make a profit. It exists to assist its inhabitants
by supplying them with products and services that will inure to
the benefit of the community as a whole.
The eventual division between public and private corporate
entities developed from the desire to protect the exclusive rights
and preserve the power of private corporations from the state:
The very purpose of the [public/private] distinction was to ensure that
some corporations, called "private," would be protected against domina-
tion by the state and that others, called "public," would be subject to such
domination. In this way the corporate anomaly was resolved so that
corporations, like the rest of society, were divided into individuals and
the state.2 '
Any attempt to completely separate the functions of a public
from a private corporation does not adequately comport with the
functions of a city. When acting in its governmental capacity, a
city sometimes operates more similarly to a private corporation.
This occurs specifically when the city performs certain of its
proprietary functions. A city can hold title to land, for instance,
as long it does so for a public purpose.'' The dual nature of the
city has led to the characterization of a city as both a corporate
and political body. 2
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Byrne v. Chicago G.R. Co., 48 N.E. 703, 705 (Ill. 1897). Other
cases adopt this same perspective in discussing a municipality and its purpose and
function. See also Dunn v. Mayor and Council of City of Wilmington, 212 A.2d 596
(Del. Super. Ct. 1965). The court in Dunn stated that:
The conception [of the city as a political and governmental organ differs wide-
ly from the view sometimes taken] that a city or town is not a governmental
organ at all, but is simply a "business corporation," or organization designed
to give service, and to be managed on what are termed 'business principles"
in somewhat the same manner as the private corporation is controlled by its
board of directors, or as is often the case, by a select few for the sole purpose
of pecuniary profit.
Dunn, 212 A.2d at 604 (quoting 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 11.106
(3d ed. 1964)).
See also Mayor & City Council of Nashville v. Ray, 86 U.S. 468 (1874). Ear-
ly on, the Supreme Court took the position that the city is a public institution,
created for public purposes only and hence has "none of the peculiar qualities and
characteristics of a trading company instituted for purposes of private gain, except
that of acting in a corporate capacity." Ray, 86 U.S. at 475. With emphasis the
Court in Ray stated: "Its [municipal corporation] objects, its responsibilities and its
powers are different." Id.
120. See Frug, supra note 113, at 1100.
121. See, e.g., Hoskins v. City of Orlando, 51 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1931).
122. MCQUILLIN, supra note 119, § 1.16, which provides:
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A city is called a body politic because it provides for the needs
of its citizens and has an indefinite life."23 Because the city has
the capacity to sue and be sued and to exercise eminent domain
powers, a city is called a body corporate. 24 Since a city is com-
prised of both political and business elements, its government
has "standing in politics and law.""2 5
The government began providing services in reaction to the
neglect suffered by the socially and economically distressed in
this country. This neglect became particularly evident right after
the Great Depression. Reaction to the social and economic inequi-
ties suffered by Americans at the hands of the private sector
provided the impetus behind much of President Roosevelt's New
Deal legislation.2 6 The next spate of social legislation came
about with the attempt by the government to address racial in-
equalities during the 1960's. ' The government responded to
demands by African-Americans that they be included in the sub-
stance of American life."2 During these time periods, govern-
ments discerned an imbalance in access to public services left
unmet by private enterprise. The city, as the body corporate and
[The city was] an association of individuals joined together to accomplish some
lawful purpose. It had perpetual succession, and therefore it is called . . . a
body politic, and also a corporation or body incorporate, because the persons
are made into a body and are of capacity to take, grant, etc., by a particular
name; to sue and be sued; and to have a common seal. These essential ele-
ments completed the corporate entity and gave the municipal government a
standing in politics and law.
Id.
The term "body corporate and politic" was originally used to describe the
municipal corporation when it acted in its traditional role as the provider of govern-
mental services. For instance, the preamble to the 1786 Constitution of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts read as follows:
The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals: it is a
social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws
for the common good.
MASS. CONST. of 1786 pmbl.
In 1786 when the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts formal-
ly established the geographic boundaries of each town, it proclaimed: "the inhabit-
ants of every town within this Government are hereby declared to be a body politic
and corporate." See McQUILLIN, supra note 119, § 1.15. This conjunctive language
stuck, and courts and legislative bodies oftentimes use the phrase to refer to a legal
entity that is created to perform essential public functions. Id.
123. MCQUILLIN, supra note 119, § 1.16.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See HARVEY BROOKS, SEEKING EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY: PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE RoLEs, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS; NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEETING SO-
CukL NEEDS (1984).
127. See BROOKS, supra note 126.
128. See id.
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politic, evolved to perform tasks that came to be known as essen-
tial governmental services.
The growth of populations centered in the municipal geograph-
ic area caused residents in those areas to look to the municipal
governments to provide what the residents considered to be es-
sential services.' Due to residents' demands, cities began to
provide certain services to those residing within its boundaries.
These services, such as constructing parks,' furnishing wa-
ter,"' maintaining streets,"2  and supporting fire protec-
tion" assumed a "public" persona because they were provided
by the municipal government. Thus, they came to be known as
public or governmental services.
The purpose of a public corporation is not to make a profit, nor
does it exist merely to provide and produce services for its inhab-
itants. Although a municipal corporation does provide services,
its objective is much broader. A municipal corporation exists to
advance the prosperity of the whole community." The munici-
pal corporation ensures the health and safety of its inhabitants,
regulates to the extent necessary to achieve those goals, and
protects those within its boundaries who are unable to protect
themselves."' It functions as the body politic of the municipal
community and exercises a portion of the political power of the
state. 136
The Court in Nashville v. Ray".7 distinguished between a pri-
129. McQUILLIN, supra note 119, § 1.08.
130. See Fahey v. Jersey City, 244 A.2d 97, 100 (N.J. 1968) ("Public parks,
open spaces, playgrounds and places for public resort, rest and recreation are facili-
ties anciently provided by local government . . . public parks are operated as a
governmental service.") (quoting Coleman v. Township of Edison, 232 A.2d 187, 189
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967)).
131. See Eastern Ill. State Normal Sch. v. City of Charleston, 111 N.E. 573,
575 (Ill. 1916) ("In the creation of a system of waterworks and the operation of the
same for the purpose of protection against fire, flushing sewers, or other uses per-
taining to the public health and safety, the city is in the exerci'e of the police pow-
er and is therefore exercising a governmental function.").
132. See City of Benwood v. Interstate Bridge Co., 30 F. Supp. 952, 959 (N.D.
W.Va. 1940) ('The construction and maintenance of streets and alleys within the
territorial limits of a city would seem to be a governmental function. . .).
133. See Delaware Liquor Store, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Wilmington,
75 A.2d 272, 275 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950) ("Municipal enterprises relating to the pres-
ervation of peace, the care of the poor, the public health, and the prevention of the
destruction of property by fire are among those enterprises generally classified in the
category of governmental functions.").
134. See Byrne v. Chicago, 48 N.E. 703 (Ill. 1897).
135. Id.; see also Maccabee Investments, Inc. v. Markham, 311 So.2d 718 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
136. Kennelly v. Kent County Water Auth., 89 A.2d 188, 190-91 (R.I. 1952).
137. 86 U.S. 468 (1874).
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vate and public corporation as follows:
A municipal corporation is a subordinate branch of the domestic govern-
ment of a State. It is instituted for public purposes only; and has none of
the peculiar qualities and characteristics of a trading corporation, insti-
tuted for purposes of private gain, except that of acting in a corporate
capacity. Its objects, its responsibilities, and its powers are different. As a
local governmental institution, it exists for the benefit of the people with-
in its corporate limits. The legislature invests it with such powers as it
deems adequate to the ends to be accomplished."
In order to ensure that local residents retain the sense of com-
munity and quality of life to which they are entitled, certain gov-
ernmental activities must be designated as "essential." Such
services are essential because the recipients of these services
have acquired a "right" to receive them. For example, in the
Jackson case, Ms. Jackson claimed that she had "an entitlement
to reasonably continuous electrical service in her home." 39 She
based her argument upon a state statute that required public
utilities to "furnish and maintain"" appropriate utility service
in a manner that was "reasonably continuous and without unrea-
sonable interruptions or delay."' The Court declined to ad-
dress whether the provision of electrical service to Ms. Jackson
was an "entitlement." Rather, the Court directed its attention to
the issue of whether Metropolitan Edison was providing an "es-
sential public service" to determine if state action was pres-
ent. 
42
In his analysis, Justice Rehnquist first lists several cases that
demonstrate the type of powers that are traditionally reserved to
138. Ray, 86 U.S. at 475. See also Mayor & Alderman of Wetumpka v.
Wetumpka Wharf Co., 63 Ala. 611 (1879). The court in Weturnpha stated:
Municipal corporations are strictly of political institution; they are but parts of
the internal government of the State. All their purposes and objects are pub-
lic, and the power they exercise, if not delegated to them, would reside in the
General Assembly, or in some other department of the government. There is
not a power the city could exercise through the agency of the mayor and
aldermen, under the original act of incorporation, that is not governmental;
and these powers are confined in the sphere of operation to the territorial
limits of the city .... Private gain, trading speculation, or the derivation of
pecuniary profit, are not purposes or objects within the contemplation of the
charter; and no powers are conferred to stimulate, encourage, or advance such
purposes, further than the incidental encouragement and advancement, which
may follow a prudent exercise of the powers of local government.
Wetumpka, 63 Ala. at 624-25.
139. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 347-48. See' supra notes 86-100 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Jackson.
140. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 348 n.2.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 352.
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states: conducting elections, operating a company town such as
the one in Marsh, and maintaining a municipal park." He also
mentioned the power of eminent domain as an example of au-
thority that has been "traditionally associated with sovereign-
ty."1' " While he conceded that electric service must be provided,
Justice Rehnquist found no requirement that the state be the
entity that provides that service." The provision of electric ser-
vice has not been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State."' 6
Justice Marshall, however, disagreed, and argued that Metro-
politan Edison did provide an essential public service. "7 In as-
serting that state action was, in fact, present, Justice Marshall
relied heavily upon the fact that Metropolitan Edison provided an
"essential public service that is in many communities supplied by
the government."'" He recognized that Metropolitan Edison
was the only entity, public or private, to provide the service, and,
143. Id. In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court de-
termined that operating a park was an example of a function that was exclusively
reserved to states. Evans, 382 U.S. at 302. In Evans, a United. States Senator from
Georgia executed a will that left a one hundred acre parcel of land to the City of
Macon. According to the terms of the Senator's will, the land was to be operated as
a park reserved for use by whites. Id. at 297. The City of Macon adhered to the
terms of the will for some time, but eventually sought to be removed as trustee,
asserting that it could not legally enforce racial segregation in the park. Id. Al-
though a private entity would serve as the new trustee for the park, Macon would
continue the maintenance and upkeep of the park. Id. at 297-98. In effect, the city
sought to privatize the provision of the park, while keeping its production under
governmental control.
In a 4-3 decision, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that because
the park was an "integral part of the City of Macon's activities," the change from
public to private oversight was not enough to withdraw Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional protections:
[Ilt was swept, manicured, watered, patrolled, and maintained by the city as a
public facility for whites only, as well as granted tax exemption .... The mo-
mentum it acquired as a public facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by
the appointment of "private" trustees .... If the municipality remains en-
twined in the management or control of the park, it remains subject to the re-
straints of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 301.
The majority was quick to point out, however, that if the provision (rather
than just the production) of a service previously furnished by the government was
privatized, constitutional protections might not apply. Id. at 300. In Flagg Bros.,
Inc., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim that
Evans determined that the operation of a park for recreational purposes was an
exclusive public function. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159 n.8. See infra notes 151-66
and accompanying text for a discussion of Flagg Brothers.
144. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 366 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 371.
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coupled with the state's extensive regulations, found no obstacles
to classifying the provision of the electric service as an essential
public service.'49 He explained:
The fact that Metropolitan Edison Co. supplies an essential public service
that is in many communities supplied by the government weighs more
heavily for me than for the majority. The Court concedes that state ac-
tion might be present if the activity in question were "traditionally asso-
ciated with sovereignty," but it then undercuts that point by suggesting
that a particular service is not a public function if the State in question
has not required that it be governmentally operated. This reads the "pub-
lic function" argument too narrowly. The whole point of the "public
function" cases is to look behind the State's decision to provide public
services through private parties.Ln
Justice Marshall's view of what constitutes an essential public
service was not embraced by a majority of the Supreme Court.
Four years later, Justice Rehnquist, in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks,15' had the opportunity to clarify his position respecting
which governmental powers had been traditionally reserved ex-
clusively to states."2
Flagg Brothers, Inc. was a storage company that stored furni-
ture belonging to Ms. Shirley Herriott Brooks following Ms.
Brooks' eviction from her apartment."3 After Ms. Brooks re-
ceived notice, pursuant to New York's Commercial Code, that her
furniture would be sold unless she paid her account, she brought
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a violation of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."M Ms. Brooks claimed that the resolution of a private dis-
pute was a traditional function of government, and that by dele-
gating this function to Flagg Brothers, state action was pres-
ent. 155
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that
although many functions had traditionally been performed by the
government, very few had been "exclusively reserved to the
State."1 5 6 He elucidated the claim he made in Jackson; that
elections and a company town fall within the definition of exclu-
sive state functions.5 7 According to Justice Rehnquist, since the
149. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 366-70.
150. Id. at 371 (citations omitted).
151. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
152. Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 155.
153. Id. at 153.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 157.
156. Id. at 158.
157. Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 158, 159. The Court retreated from its earlier
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election process is the only one in which public officials are se-
lected, "the conduct of the elections themselves is an exclusively
public function." 5' Furthermore, under his constricted interpre-
tation of Marsh, when a private entity performs all the "neces-
sary municipal functions" of a town, the private entity is per-
forming activities that have been exclusively reserved to
states.'59 Thus, in that circumstance, private property can be
treated as though it were public."s Stressing the "exclusivity"
present in the scenarios previously described, Justice Rehnquist
distinguished the fact situation in Flagg Brothers.6' The dis-
pute between Ms. Brooks and Flagg Brothers was purely pri-
vate."'2 Moreover, Ms. Brooks had other remedies available to
settle her dispute." Flagg Brothers' actions were not trans-
formed into some type of exclusive state action simply because it
chose to sell Ms. Brook's furniture pursuant to a state stat-
ute. 164
The Court admitted that there were other state and municipal
functions that could be considered exclusively reserved to states
that did not fall within either the conduct of elections or the
Marsh analysis." 5  Without explanation, Justice Rehnquist
placed fire and police protection, education, and tax collection in
this category.'66
In both Flagg Brothers and Jackson, the Court unnecessarily
position in Evans that seemed to include the operation of a park as a function that
was exclusively reserved to states.
158. Id. at 158.
159. Id. at 158-59.
160. Id. at 159.
161. Id. at 160. The Court stated:
[Tihe proposed sale by Flagg Brothers ... is not the only means of resolving
this purely private dispute. Presumably, . . . she [one of the plaintiffs] ...
could have sought to replevy her goods at any time under state law. The
challenged statute itself provides a damages remedy against the warehouse-
man for violations of its provisions. This system of rights and remedies, recog-
nizing the traditional place of private arrangements in ordering relationships
in the commercial world, can hardly be said to have delegated to Flagg Broth-
ers an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign.
Id (citations omitted).
162. Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 160.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 163.
166. Id. The Court concluded:
We express no view as to the extent, if any, to which a city or State might
be free to delegate to private parties the performance of such functions and
thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth amendment. The mere recitation
of these possible permutations and combinations of factual situations suffices
to caution us that their resolution should abide the necessity of deciding them.
Id. at 163-64.
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and unreasonably limited its definition of what constitutes an
"essential public service." Election contests and fire and police
protection are not the only municipal services that should be
characterized as essential. Particularly in the context of privat-
ization, an expansive view of what is essential is imperative in
order to protect the citizens of the municipality.167
Traditionally, certain public services have been designated as
"essential." As Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in Flagg Broth-
ers, such services have included fire and police protection,'"
and public school education.' The willingness to denote police
and fire services as essential stems from the appreciation for the
need for the government to provide those services, coupled with
the fact that the government has historically provided those services.
70
167. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). This article
discusses this concept of expansive interpretation of essential services in terms of an
ever changing and expanding "government largess." Id. at 734. Reich explains that
an individual's personhood has evolved over time to consist of "rights or status rath-
er than of tangible goods." Id. at 738. These forms of government largess, such as
the individual's practice of his or her occupation, the ability to receive benefits, and
the capability to be licensed, are an integral part of the life of that individual. Id.
They are inexorably intertwined with the status of the individual and must be
viewed as a right of the individual, rather than a privilege bestowed by the govern-
ment: "The presumption should be that the professional man will keep his license,
and the welfare recipient his pension. These interests should be vested." Id. at 785.
168. See, e.g., Hillsdale PBA Local 27 v. Borough of Hillsdale, 644 A.2d 564,
567 (N.J. 1994). The court in Hillsdale stated:
The Borough contends that police and fire department salary increases have
exceeded increases for other public and private employees and have out-
stripped the cost of living. From its perspective, police and fire fighters have
received disproportionately high wage increases. From another perspective,
police and fire fighters perform essential public services, often at great risk
and with little recognition.
Hillsdale, 644 A.2d at 567.
See also Masloff v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 613 A.2d. 1186, 1191
(Pa. 1992) ("To the extent that Local 85's argument suggests that the adverse effect
on the threat to essential public services such as fire and police protection . . . are
the ordinary and unanticipated consequences of a transit strike, we are unpersuad-
ed.").
169. See Lenox Educ. Ass'n v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 471 N.E.2d 81 (Mass.
1984) (holding that public education is an essential public service).
170. See, e.g., Rector v. Eastchester, 99 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). Cit-
ies emerged as financial and social focal points of any given geographic area. Clus-
ters of previously independently-minded citizens attempted to maximize their ability
to provide for themselves and their families by pooling their resources. Business en-
terprises were located in close proximity to private homes in order to more easily
serve as many individuals as possible. Individuals took comfort in being close to
their neighbors for safety, economic and social reasons. Smaller parcels of land cost
less money, and groups could more easily fight undesirables than could individuals.
As the colonists banded together to form their cities/communities, they began
to rely upon one another to provide certain services. McQUILLIN, supra note 119, §
1.15. For instance, the colonists' community spirit spawned the development of pri-
vatized police protection systems. Id. Initially, citizens either volunteered to patrol
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Essential public services should be characterized as rights of
the individual that cannot be taken away without due process or
just compensation. Essential public services are a right that has
vested with the individual, and must be provided by the govern-
ment, not the private sector.
Moreover, since the purposes of a public and private corpora-
tion are vastly different, the consequences of permitting private
entities to perform public functions will be perverse:
Once the line between "public" and "private" becomes meaningless and is
erased, the various units of the Corporate State no longer appear to be
parts of a diverse and pluralistic system in which one kind of power
limits another kind of power; the various centers of power do not limit
each other, they all weigh in on the same side of the scale, with only the
individual on the other side. With public and private merged, we can
discern the real monolith of power and realize there is nothing at all
within the system to impose checks and balances, to offer competition, to
raise even a voice of caution or doubt. We are all involuntary members,
and there is no zone of the private to offer a retreat."'
The private corporation cannot be entrusted with the responsi-
bility of maintaining and nurturing the rights of the individual.
Part of the basis for the separation between the public and pri-
vate enterprise is to protect the citizenry from the tyranny of
both entities. When decision-making, planning and programming
that were under the auspices of the public government are trans-
ferred to the control of a private corporation, the city residents
lose whatever recourse they previously possessed to provide re-
dress for their grievances.
Since the corporation must make a profit, the administrators of
the corporate entity become tied to their roles as administrators.
Without the primary goal of working for the public good, the
private administrator must embark upon a specific course of
action:
[H]e is incapable of thinking of general values, or of assuming responsi-
bility for society. He can do that only in the diminishing area outside his
role. Consider an automobile company executive. He can propose public
housing as a solution to the urban crisis. But he cannot propose that
the city or were assigned the task by the local governmental unit. Id. If an individ-
ual failed to serve his turn as the night watchman, he was fined by the city. Id.
Eventually, those who had money and who did not want to perform their night
watch duty paid others to function in their stead. Id. After a time this "arrange-
ment" no longer served the interests of the general populace. Id. Residents began to
think of police protection as a necessary service, albeit one that should be provided
for by the government. Id. Therefore, the local governing councils started to provide
police protection, and paid for it from revenues received by taxing the citizenry. Id.
171. CHARLES REICH, GREENING OF AMERICA 100 (1971).
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fewer cars be produced, or that models be kept the same, to save money
for public housing. Thus his role prevents him from acting for the com-
munity in the one area where he has power to act, and it prevents him
from even realizing that his cars are one of the things draining money
that should be used for cities. As long as he is in his role, he cannot act
or think responsibly within the community. Outside his role, if there is
any outside, he is virtually powerless, for his power lies in the role.'
Consigning the provision of municipal functions to private
organizations is akin to asking the wolf to guard the henhouse.
The private administrator will make decisions based upon what
is best for the company, not what is best for the public at large.
Of course, those who own stock in the company may vote to
change the management or institute new policies and procedures.
But what happens to those who are not stockholders? They will
be eliminated, in effect, disenfranchised, from the decision-mak-
ing process. Such persons will not have the ability to impact
decisions that affect the operation of their community.
Returning to the example of the homeowner association, the
association has as its main concern the preservation of the prop-
erty values of its assets and the protection of the physical well-
being of its residents. 7' The homeowner association accomplish-
es its goals through the use of various restrictions on the behav-
ior of its residents and their guests.'7 ' In the hands of the pri-
vate sector, individual freedoms give way to the need to conform
for the sake of monetary gain.
A public government is concerned about property values, but it
also serves to address the social, political, and economic needs of
its residents. Consideration about the well-being of the greater
community is absent in the private company. The private market
rests fundamentally on self-interest. Altruistic instincts and the
potential for cooperation fall by the wayside as the need to ac-
quire material goods takes precedence. The very attributes that
private enterprise fosters works well in the private sector. How-
ever, these attributes can serve to destroy the public corporation.
The market atomizes society, emphasizes society, emphasizes material
acquisition, and caters to immediate gratification. Consequently, there is
a risk that the use of the market for welfare ends may loosen the bonds
of community . . . and citizens may no longer harbor social concerns."'
172. REICH, supra note 171, at 125-26.
173. See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, IN PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS
AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOvERNMENT (1994) (providing a detailed
history of the homeowner association and its rise to prominence as a means to pre-
serve homogeneousness in housing developments).
174. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
175. Clarence Stone, Whither the Welfare State? Professionalization, Bureaucracy,
1995
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In sum, the market works well for certain social purposes but
not so well for others. A preoccupation with privatization and its
emphasis on efficiency, competition, and market forces may over-
look other interests and issues that are vital to the public's social
and economic well-being.
CONCLUSION
The elderly gentleman from OMNI has been consumed by greed
and the need for power. The perfect city that he planned, that was
to be operated by OMNI, has blown up in his face. The privatized
police force, which consisted of a legion of one, was beset by ineffi-
ciency and rife with malfunction. The elderly gentleman has been
defeated, and the city has been returned to its citizens, complete
with all of its bumps, bruises, and warts.
Perhaps, in a perfect world, there would be no need for the
public sector to be involved in the delivery of any type of goods or
services. Private entrepreneurs would ascertain and fulfill identi-
fied needs of community residents. All residents would receive
the same level of service at a price that they could afford to pay.
No need would go unmet and the necessity for government to be
the producer and provider of goods and services would be nonex-
istent.
However, we do not live in a perfect world. The days that are
fondly recalled as the "good old days" before governmental inter-
vention and intrusion into the lives of the everyday citizen were
a glorious time only for a select few. Although selected forms of
privatization, i.e. "contracting out," may cause little harm to the
residents of cities, wholesale privatization of the provision of
public services should be viewed skeptically. Privatization is not
a panacea for the ills of the city, and will, in fact, cause much
greater harm than good.
and the Market Alternative, 93 ETHIcS 588, 594 (1983). Similar concerns are ex-
pressed in Mimi Abramovitz, The Privatization of the Welfare State: A Review, SO-
CIAL WoRK 257 (1986). Ms. Abramovitz states:
Purchased services and vouchers drain public programs of those who can ab-
sorb the economic risks of the market, the less fortunate-the poor, the sick,
the less educated, and the unskilled-become increasingly segregated and thus
more vulnerable politically. Not only is social justice thwarted, such an ar-
rangement reverses the fundamental social welfare principle that services
should be available on the basis of need and not limited to those who can
pay.
Id. at 259.
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